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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
  
When examining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we look principally at 
two issues – whether there was deficient performance of counsel and if so, whether there 
was prejudice.  Here, our focus revolves around whether counsel provided effective 
assistance concerning the trial court’s jury instructions.  Appellant Daliyl Raaid 
Muhammad argues that prejudice abounds and because of the trial court’s error in its 
instructions to the jury there is a reasonable probability of a different result.  We disagree.  




** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 





In January 2002, James Nickol called Muhammad to purchase marijuana from 
him.  Muhammad agreed to meet Nickol later that evening in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
for a drug exchange.  Nickol and a companion, Derrick Kleugel, then drove to 
Harrisburg.  Upon their arrival, Muhammad informed Nickol and Kleugel that they 
would have to walk a few blocks to get the marijuana.  Muhammad was accompanied by 
another man, later identified as co-defendant Michael Cameron.   
“At some point while the four men were walking down South 15th Street, 
[Muhammad] and Cameron slowly began to lag behind the victims.”  App. at 193.  
“Gunfire then rang out.”  Id.  “Nickol was shot three times in the back, three times in the 
stomach, and once in the hip.  Kleugel was shot twice in the back and once in the hip.”  
Id.  Nickol testified that Muhammad climbed on top of him while holding something 
shiny in his hand and demanded money.  Nickol handed Muhammad $500 of the $2,400 
he had in his pocket and told Muhammad that the rest of the money was in Kleugel’s car.  
“Kleugel also testified that after he fell, someone searched him and demanded money.”  
App. at 193.   
The lack of casings found at the scene suggested that the shots came from 
revolvers and not automatic weapons.  The number of gunshot wounds suggested that 
more than one gun was used.  Muhammad was ultimately apprehended six months later 





At trial, after closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury that Muhammad 
needed to have a specific intent to kill to be found guilty of attempted homicide under 
state law.  But the trial court also told the jury that it could convict Muhammad of 
attempted homicide if “the Defendant or an accomplice or a co-conspirator did the act or 
acts with a specific intent to kill James Nickol.”  App. 157.   
During their deliberations, the jury asked the trial court for clarification on the 
elements of attempted homicide.  The trial court again equivocated on the standard: 
Two things have to come together in time.  Some act which you the jury find 
to be a substantial step toward attempting to kill someone, in this case, Mr. 
Nickol, and that at the same time, whoever the person is that’s doing that act 
is either the Defendant, an accomplice or a co-conspirator, and that person 
has in their mind the intention to kill Mr. Nickol.  
 
App. at 178.  Trial counsel did not object to these instructions.   
The jury ultimately found Muhammad guilty of attempted homicide, robbery, 
criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, flight to avoid 
apprehension, escape, resisting arrest, and false identification to law enforcement 
authorities.  Based on the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced Muhammad to an 
aggregate term of thirty-seven to ninety years in prison.   
Muhammad pursued claims on appeal and post-conviction applications in the 
Pennsylvania state courts.  He argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object.  The state courts held that the trial 





conviction for attempted homicide requires intent to commit the crime.  The District 
Court reviewed Muhammad’s federal habeas petition and similarly found that the trial 
judge had accurately stated the law and that counsel was not ineffective.  This appeal 
followed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  “In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 
we exercise plenary review of the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 
512 (3d Cir. 1997).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Muhammad argues that the trial court’s jury instructions inaccurately stated the 
law on attempted homicide thereby violating his federal due process rights.  He also 
maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions 
and as a result, he is entitled to a new trial.1   
 
 
1 Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a prisoner in 
state custody can only seek habeas relief once he has exhausted all remedies in the state 
courts.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  To satisfy that exhaustion requirement, the 
defendant’s constitutional claims, or their “substantial equivalent,” must be “‘fairly 
presented’ to the state courts.”  Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513 (quoting Evans v. Court of 
Common Pleas, Delaware Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992)).  This is not a 





We agree with Muhammad that the jury instructions were erroneous, and that trial 
counsel’s failure to object to the instructions fell below the standard for competent 
representation.  But the erroneous jury instruction was harmless, and counsel’s failure to 
object did not prejudice Muhammad. 
A. Jury Instructions and Counsel’s Ineffective Assistance 
 Pennsylvania law requires proof of specific intent to kill for each individual 
charged with attempted criminal homicide, even where the parties are accomplices or 
coconspirators.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 901(a); id. § 2501(a).  “A person commits 
attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 
substantial step toward the commission of that crime.”  Id. § 901(a). 
Under Strickland v. Washington, a petitioner shows ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on the following: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient. . . .  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”  466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To establish deficiency 
of performance under the Strickland standard, the petitioner must show that counsel’s 
 
 
argument, the Commonwealth conceded that Muhammad presented both an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and a due process claim to the PCRA courts.  We agree that 
the District Court correctly found that Muhammad satisfied his requirement to exhaust.  





representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms considering all the circumstances.  Id. at 688.   
Here, the trial court correctly told the jury that a defendant needed to have a 
specific intent to kill to be found guilty of attempted homicide under state law, and that 
“[a] person cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime unless he has . . . a firm 
intent to commit that crime.” App. at 158.  But the court also told the jury that it should 
convict for attempted homicide if “the Defendant or an accomplice or a co-conspirator 
did the act or acts with specific intent to kill James Nickol.”  App. at 157.  That 
instruction could have been interpreted to mean that only one accomplice or conspirator 
needed to have such an intent.  This Court has consistently held that such an instruction 
does not comply with federal due process requirements.  See, e.g., Tyson v. 
Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 976 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2020); Bennett v. 
Superintendent Graterford SCI, 886 F.3d 268, 288 (3d Cir. 2018); Laird v. Horn, 414 
F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 2005); Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 416 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Because the trial court stated the erroneous instructions twice—once during its 
primary instruction and again in response to a question from the jury during 
deliberations—we conclude that counsel’s failure to object fell below the standard of 






  Nevertheless, the erroneous jury instructions and defense counsel’s failure to 
object to them did not prejudice Muhammad.   
 To show prejudice, a defendant must show that counsel’s act or omission “actually 
had an adverse effect on the defense.”  Strickland,  466 U.S. at 693.  According to 
Strickland, 
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
 
Id. at 694.  We must consider the totality of the evidence because “a verdict or conclusion 
only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than 
one with overwhelming record support.”  Id. at 696. 
When a claim was not procedurally defaulted and was adjudicated on the merits 
by the state court, we afford the state court’s determinations deference under AEDPA.  
Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011).  In doing so, we determine whether the state 
court’s determinations: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  In this instance, because the PCRA Court adjudicated 





finding that the jury instruction did not prejudice Muhammad.  See App. at 280 (“[E]ven 
if [the trial court] gave an ambiguous instruction, the Defendant would still not have been 
prejudiced.”).   
Here, we cannot conclude that the PCRA court’s prejudice finding was 
constitutionally unreasonable or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.  
There was a quantum of strong evidence presented at trial from which a jury could 
conclude that Muhammad possessed an intent to kill, and from which a court could 
reasonably find that no different result would have occurred.  Muhammad conceded there 
was sufficient evidence in the record placing him at the scene, and Nickol testified that 
Muhammad was one of the two individuals walking directly behind the victims when the 
shots were fired.  Both victims were shot in vital areas:  Nickol was shot three times in 
the back, three times in the stomach, and once in the hip, and Kleugel was shot twice in 
the back and once in the hip.   
Moreover, expert testimony suggested that more than one gun was fired because 
of the nature of the casings and the number of shots fired.2  “Nickol specifically identified 
 
 
2 Muhammad argues that the fact that he was acquitted of possession of a firearm means 
the jury did not think possession had been proved.  To the extent that Muhammad wants 
the Court to infer that this acquittal undermines the intent to kill, we are unconvinced.  
There is no basis in case law suggesting that we should conclude that Muhammad’s 
acquittal on the gun possession charge would necessarily raise an inference that he is not 





[Muhammad] kneeling over him, demanding money, and holding what was likely a shiny 
firearm.”  App. at 195-96.  These facts, together with the cajoling of both individuals to 
go to an isolated area upon their arrival to Harrisburg, are the type of evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that there was intent to kill.  And Pennsylvania courts have 
held that repeated use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of a victim’s body is enough to 
infer intent to kill.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 
2005) (“Appellant’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of each victim’s body is 
sufficient to establish specific intent to kill.”); Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 855 A.2d 
783, 789 (Pa. 2004) (stating that when the defendant was shot in the abdomen, he was 
shot in a vital part of his body); Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 908 (Pa. 
2002) (explaining that the defendant’s targeting of the victim’s chest, abdomen, and side 
were sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree murder); Commonwealth v. 
Hilliard, 172 A.3d 5, 12 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is reasonable to infer the shooter’s intent 
from both the number of gunshot wounds he inflicted and the use of a deadly weapon 




57, 67-68 (1984) (explaining that a defendant is not entitled to have a conviction on one 
count set aside because it is inconsistent with an acquittal on another count). 
 
3 We have concluded as part of our analysis of Muhammad’s ineffective assistance of 










find proof that he had specific intent to kill.   But we have also concluded that this error 
did not prejudice Muhammad.  Such a conclusion also means that the error was harmless 
under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) for the purposes of Muhammad’s due 
process claim.  Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 147 n.18 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Strickland 
prejudice and Brecht harmless error are essentially the same standard.” (citation 
omitted)); Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 258 n.18 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that “if a 
habeas petitioner meets the Strickland test, then he/she need not also demonstrate that the 
error was harmful”); see also Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 242 n.65 
(3d Cir. 2017).  Although in its brief the Commonwealth made no argument on harmless 
error related to the due process claim, therefore waiving that argument, we can reach 
harmless error analysis sua sponte.  See United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2000).   
 
